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Abstract 
This article is based on virus theory (Røvik, 2007, 2011), and proposes to develop a 
framework that defines technology as a virus that penetrates the organism of an organization. 
The framework develops a new vocabulary, which can help in analyzing technologies and 
their negative effects on actors and organizations. In this paper, the virus theory is used to 
analyze a strategy process in an organization as an example of a technology. It shows how the 
strategy over time creates a memory loss, where the managers who are exposed to the virus 
forget their critique of the new strategy concept. The article also shows how resistant can be 
understood as being immune to a virus, since the strategy concepts bears resemblance to a 
former strategy concept. The article also argues that there should be more focus on the 
negative impacts of management tool and especially how organizations and managers are 
dealing with these negative effects.  
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“An idea is like a virus, resilient, highly contagious.  
The smallest seed of an idea can grow.  
It can grow to define or destroy you.” 
From the movie Inception 
Introduction 
The idea for this article came while I had a conversation with a immunologist, which is a 
doctor with a special in disorders of the immune system, and we talked about the impact of 
strategies on organizations and potential links to virus theory. Røvik (2007, 2011) has written 
about using viruses as a metaphor when describing how ideas behave in an organization. They 
penetrate, they incubate and they can even mutate. Røvik notes that the metaphor can be 
perceived negatively and that it is not his intention. This article argues, however, that the virus 
theory actually is an analogy of a greater problem since the virus not only acts in a certain 
way but also affects its host in different ways.  
 
The purpose of using such an analogy is to make it possible to study, analyze, and discuss 
primarily the negative effects of the strategy on the members of the organization from a new 
and different perspective. In the mainstream part of the literature on technology, it seems that 
resistance to a certain technology is considered to be solely negative and thus a barrier to be 
overcome, so the technology can proceed to influence the organization in a positive way. The 
virus perspective, however, argues that resistance can be seen as part of the immune system 
and therefore a positive reaction, because it helps the organizations to function and survive 
even though it is attacked by all sort of malicious viruses. Consequently, this article suggests 
that the accepted truth should be turned around by defining technology as something negative 
and resistance as something positive.  
 
The literature focuses on both the intended as well as the unintended effects of technologies. 
The unintended effects have been given the neutral name emergence. This article proposes to 
add a further distinction, by distinguishing between positive and negative effects. We lack the 
differentiated concepts to describe, analyze, and discuss both the positive and negative effects 
that a technology has on the members of an organization. One way of building literacy in the 
field is by learning from the field of virology. 
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This article starts by asking, “what is an idea” thus reminding us that a technology is an idea. 
It uses strategy as an example of such a technology. The article then moves on to describe the 
many facets of strategy and reiterates that are in the literature and its effects generally are 
defined in a solely positive way and resistance is defined in an exclusively negative way. It 
seems unlikely, however, that there would be no negative side effects from resistance, so 
therefore there is a need for an analytic framework to aid in the study of this. The chosen 
framework in this article is virus theory. The article introduces examples of how a strategy 
infects an organization from the public sector and how it affects the managers in that 
institution in different ways. The article concludes by encouraging more research into the 
negative effects of technologies and the development of new ways to explain the well-
documented resistance against technologies. 
 
 
What is an idea? 
The concept ‘idea’ is used as a generic term for attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, concepts, 
norms, and organization recipes without having a common definition, but focuses on how 
they spread, transmit, and diffuse or how they are translated. The concept idea’s 
epistemological status is not defined and is categorized in various ways (Campbell, 2004; 
120). In this article, the definition of an idea is taken from Røviks virus theory (2007, 2011). 
It defines the concept in terms of its properties, which are comparable to a virus "spreading 
contagious, immunity, adoption and effects." (Røvik, 2011, 635) 
 
Ideas in organizations have been studied in various ways. In this context, it is useful to 
distinguish between the material and the immaterial, since it is highly debatable whether an 
objective epistemology is possible when it comes to something as intangible as an idea. It is 
relatively easy to study the spread of a piece of technology such as a laptop, while the major 
changes an idea undergoes when it is travelling or is translated before it ceases to be the same 
idea can be critically discussed. It is difficult to get a complete overview of all the idea's 
components. This is because there is no connection between the name and the content. In the 
material world, it is easier to discuss whether a laptop is still a laptop if the screen is removed 
during the journey than whether the Balanced Scorecard is still a Balanced Scorecard, if you 
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replace some elements with others. 
 
Røvik uses the term handling to describe how organizations respond to ideas (2011). This 
term covers both diffusion (Rogers, 2003), travel (Czarniawska, 1996, 2005), transfer 
(Birkinshaw et al, 2010; Szulanski, 1996), translation (Czarniawska & G. Sevón, 1996; 
Callon, 1986, Latour, 1987; Røvik, 1997, 2011), and fashion (Abrahamson, 1996, 2011; 
Esposito, 2011; Bort & Kieser, 2011). 
 
These approaches assume that the organization has a high degree of autonomy in terms of 
how ideas should be handled to fit the organization. Although organizational ideas share 
attributes with viruses, virus theory challenges the assumption of autonomy, since it is not the 
host that controls the virus. From a virus perspective, the idea has its own life and interacts 
with the host. The host did not choose to become infected, is not necessarily aware of the 
infection before the negative effects are noticeable and cannot predict what's going to happen 
as a result of it. Some might question the claim that we carry ideas unconsciously. Here it can 
be argued that we do not know what happens when an idea goes from one person to another. 
It can be an advantage or it can be a disadvantage. We do not know how it will influence the 
existing ideas of the other, if the effects on or in its host will be positive, negative, or maybe 
both in different areas. 
 
The organization as a host 
In this perspective, an organization becomes an organism. It turns around the conventional 
truth that the strategy should be seen as something positive and resistance as something 
negative. Therefore, the perspective gives an eye for immunity (Røvik, 2011). Some of them 
are congenital and others are acquired. The more viruses an organism has experienced, the 
better the immune system has become at fighting back against similar viruses. 
 
The many facets of strategy 
The phenomenon of strategy has been defined and studied in various ways (Mintzberg, 2009) 
including: as a plan (Ansoff, 1965), a process (Mintzberg, 1994), a practice (Gerry et al, 2008; 
Whittington, 2001), decisions (Martin, 2010), a discourse (Vaara, 2010), or politics 
(Pettigrew, 1977). The point here is that the theoretical perspective influences how the 
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phenomenon is defined and studied. Therefore, these various perspectives should be seen as 
complementary to each other by focusing on different facets of the phenomenon ‘strategy’. 
 
It seems that these listed perspectives assume that actors have a high degree of autonomy in 
relation to how the strategies are employed in the organization. Since it is not the host that 
controls the virus, the virus perspective challenges this assumption. A virus has its own life 
and interacts with the host. Therefore, the host did not choose to become infected and is not 
necessarily aware of its own infection before the symptoms become noticeable and severe and 
therefore the host cannot predict how the virus will mutate or impact it. Some will surely 
question the assumption that we are unconscious carriers. Here it can be argued that we do not 
know what happens when the strategy goes from one person to another. It can be an 
advantage or it can be a disadvantage. We do not know how the strategy will influence the 
existing ideas, discourse and practices of the host or if the impact will be mainly positive or 
negative. 
 
Although a strategy has clear targets, no one knows what will happen when the strategy 
begins to infect and spread in the organization as a whole because it can mutate over time. 
Mintzberg calls this emergence, but does not address whether the unintended effects are 
positive or negative.  
 
Resistance  
The literature on strategy mainly treats resistance as something negative. (Kotter, 2008; 
Piderit, 2000; Johnson, 1992; Thomas et al, 2011). Some want to explain why resistance 
occurs, how it is exercised, and how it can be avoided or minimized (Thomas & Davis, 2005; 
Oreg et al, 2011). This article, however, defines resistance as something positive, because 
resistance protects the existing organization and is an essential part of trying to prevent 
damage to the system. It can be compared to a proper immune response. This gives a view on 
immunity to strategies (Røvik, 2011). Some of it can be innate and other parts are acquired. 
The logic is that the more viruses an organism have experienced, the stronger the immunity to 
similar viruses has become. 
 
Strategy as a virus 
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Røvik has written about the virus theory, and reminds us that it is only a metaphor. This 
article uses the virus theory as an analogy, because there are great similarities between the 
way a virus and a strategy behaves once it has penetrated an organization and begins to 
interact with its host. It is based on the 6 characteristics of viruses, as Røvik mentions: 
infectious, immune, replication, incubation, mutated, and hibernated viruses (Røvik, 
2011.646). 
 
Firstly, a virus infects only a living host. In the same manner as a strategy needs to interact 
with the actors, a virus requires cells that it can infect. The members of the organization are 
like these cells. 
 
Secondly, one can acquire immunity against a virus. This feature is particularly interesting 
when it comes to strategic work. In the strategy literature resistance is perceived as a negative 
factor, but from a virus perspective, it is something positive. The resistance can be considered 
to be part of the internal immune response that protects against the potentially damaging 
effects of the virus. When a new strategy has similarities to a strategy of the past that caused 
problems – there will be resistance. This is not because of change, but because there are actors 
who remember what happened last time that a similar strategy was present in the 
organization, and these actors are trying to prevent the repetition of the damage or problems, 
that the earlier strategy might have lead to.  
 
In addition, there are the mechanisms in an organization, which, as is the case with the outer 
immune system of the body, i.e. the skin, prevents the strategies penetrating into the 
organization. It may be legislation, systems, or models that can calculate the effects of a 
strategy before it takes place.  
 
The virus replicates itself. This is to be understood that the strategy is expanding within the 
organization in the same manner as a virus spreads in an organism. The ambition of the 
strategy is to set the agenda in the organization and that possibly affects anything and 
everything. In other words, it is difficult to restrict the effect the strategy has to certain areas 
of the organization. This is because the strategy problematizes the knowledge or practice 
which everyone takes for granted. It presents not only the desired future, but also very 
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fundamental and potentially problematic questions: – who are we, why are we here, and what 
are we doing (Lilley, 2001). 
 
The virus can incubate. This characteristic refers to the time perspective in strategic work. 
Usually it is assumed that the strategy is active as soon as it is adopted and communicated 
within the organization. The point of incubation is to understand that there might be periods 
where the strategy is inactive, and then suddenly breaks out again and shakes the 
organization. 
 
Viruses can also mutate, i.e. experience changes in genetic structure. This is known among 
other places from different kinds of the common flu. This means that the virus can spread to 
organisms, which hitherto have not been in danger of being infected. Strategies can also 
mutate and, combined with replication, strategies can penetrate into hitherto untouched parts 
of the organization. This process can also be described as a translation, but unlike the 
translation the mutation is uncontrolled, and thus is difficult to predict the final results. As 
Røvik describes, this gives the virus the possibility of not being recognized by the immune 
system (2011). In the organizational context, it may be a mutational change in a concept or 
concept name. When there is no consistency between the name and the content then it makes 
it all the more difficult to recognize and compare concepts. (See, e.g., Ax & Bjørnenak, 
2005). Therefore, the name of the strategy remains the same throughout the organization, but 
the contents can vary significantly by department. 
 
The virus can go dormant: it no longer causes symptoms, but is still present in the organism. 
This is reminiscent of strategies that still exist even though they have been replaced, and 
sometimes show up and give rise to symptoms such as confusion, because nobody knows how 
to handle this strategy. 
 
It is debatable whether the host is aware that it is infected. It can be argued that a carrier of an 
idea will try to persuade others to think positively about that idea. Some may also argue that 
at some point, the idea can no longer be perceived as man-made but as natural. This can be 
assumed to influence in cases where the host is aware of the infection that he or she subject 
others to. 
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The virus affects its host in various ways. Some can be weakened a lot by a cold, while others 
hardly react at all. The remarkable thing is that a strategy can affect one part of the 
organization in one way, while another part of the organization experiences the strategy in a 
remarkably different way. This is in contrast to what the most popular books in strategy 
declare: That the strategy can be used anywhere and by anyone who wants to succeed more. 
 
Examples on infections 
When strategic work is analyzed through virus theory it gives a different understanding of the 
negative aspects of working with strategies. It is debatable whether it is the strategy itself that 
creates the negative effects or the people who perform it that are responsible. This article does 
not distinguish between the two, as it acknowledges that it is difficult to define a clear line 
between what strategy contains and how the people are affected. A virologist utilizes a 
microscope to separate the virus from the rest of the organism, but in the immaterial world 
and in strategic work there is no access to such a piece of equipment. However, there can be a 
distinction between carrier that deliberately is trying to infect others, those who are infected 
and those who have not yet been infected with the virus. The objective is to gain a greater 
understanding of how strategies affect different parts of the organization negatively. This was 
done by participant observations in a public organization from 2011 to 2013 and by 
interviewing 12 top and middle managers. The focus was to study how the managers reacted 
on and talked about a new strategy concept. The interviews as well as the participant 
observations were coded in Nvivo using closed coding where the codes were from virus 
theory.  
 
Presentation of the case 
The chosen organization has introduced a strategy concept that comes from performance 
management theory, which focuses on the organization's impact on society. The core of the 
concept is a value chain where the organization must describe the means they use to achieve 
the desired goals. If one ignores the fact that it is difficult to separate the organizations impact 
on the goals from other organizations’ influence on the same goals, then the concept had a 
strong appeal to the top management in the organization. The earlier concept of performance 
contracts was abandoned because, as the person responsible for working with the strategies 
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stated "... we would like to be better to work long term, where the performance contracts and 
management tools that we have had so far, might have been too short-term." Here is that the 
intention of the new idea is to displace the old. The fact that this intention was not realized 
will be described later in the article 
 
The CEO told the story on how the idea came into the organization: 
 
Interviewer: "How did you get the idea of working with strategy this way." 
CEO: "It started three, almost four, years ago. Back then, we used the performance contracts 
as a management tool to control performance, like all other state institutions did and still do. 
The performance contracts are one-year contracts, with a typical range of objectives, which 
are defined at the beginning of the year and then at the end of the year we have typically 
reached a large number of targets. And we have used this instrument for many years, we have 
experimented with it, tried to refine it as a management tool. But, now I express my own 
opinion, we have never been quite happy with the way it has worked. So three or four years 
ago I attended a course for executives, and there I was, along with the other students, 
introduced to a large number of cases from private companies, which were about how private 
companies use strategy. And which strategy, explicitly or implicitly, led to the very successful 
businesses. And I started asking myself, why not do this in the public sector. So when I came 
back to the organization, we had a discussion in the management group, and I told them as 
well as I could about what it was that I had learned, and asked if it was something we should 
try to work on. And since then we have worked with it and it has gone through several, how 
should I put it, attempts to make strategies this way. And I would like to emphasize that I 
would call it experimental, and I would say that what we do is still experimental, because 
practice shows that it is enormously difficult to make it work." 
 
The idea came into the organization as the CEO had been on a course where he had been 
exposed to the concept and thought that it should replace the former model consisting of 
performance contracts. This can be described as an infection where the idea behind the 
concept has infected the decision maker in the organization, who then again deliberately tries 
to infect the rest of the organization. Note that the CEO used the word "attempts" to introduce 
the new concept. The interpretation is that nobody knows what is going to happen, which is 
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why he describes it as an experiment. It could be thought of in medical terms, where the 
guinea pig is injected with a virus so the effects can be studied. 
 
The CEO was also talking about the time perspective. According to him, the organization had 
at that time been working on this concept for almost four years. But the first meeting where 
the external consultants presented the concept to representatives of the organization happened 
two years ago. One possible explanation is that the preparation, or incubation period, lasted 
two years, a period in which the CEO had meetings with the rest of the top management 
group about this concept. 
 
Another aspect is that the concept originated from private companies. The CEO was told that 
firms had success primarily because they have a specific strategy concept, and therefore 
wanted to use the same strategy concept. He did, however, not have any reflection on how the 
conditions in a public organization are different to those in a private company. Here it can be 
seen that the virus via the rhetorical wrapping of success is largely infectious. When I asked 
about this aspect, the CEO gave the following response: 
 
Interviewer: "What is your reflection on the fact that you have imported something that is 
developed in the private sector to a public organization?" 
 
CEO: "I believe that what we've imported is the way of thinking. What we have in the 
ministry is more some thoughts and ideas on what I subjectively remember from the course. 
We have no textbook that says a strategy is this and this is how we implement it. In a sense I 
think what we have is very home-made. I think that if the excellent teachers I had in on the 
course… if they came and saw what we were doing, they would see something that they 
cannot recognize. Or, hopefully maybe they would recognize some philosophy in it, but we 
have not chosen a specific tool. And the cases from the course show that there is no such tool 
that every successful private companies use, far from it. What I got home, it was more of a 
realization that a lot of the successful companies have a strategy. And that they know what it 
is makes them competitive. And if you have it, and you also are very competitive, then you 
will become a successful private company." 
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Here is a mutation. The CEO did not use a virus terminology, but spoke about the philosophy 
and that it was home-made. It was not clear which parts of the idea they changed, when he 
spoke of a logic that directly assumes that if the organization has a strategy then it becomes 
competitive and by way of said strategy are lead to success. One could assume that he was not 
himself aware of how they changed the concept. This can be seen when he still spoke of 
competitiveness, which is not a condition for a public organization that has to corporate with 
other public organs. That very aspect was criticized by the managers in the beginning of the 
process, because the organization cooperates with many other organizations in order to 
achieve their goals. However, the concept that the CEO incorporated works from the 
assumption that the means to achieve the goal lies within the organization itself. 
 
Meeting the idea  
In the beginning of the process the managers received assistance from an external consulting 
company. The consulting company organizes study tours for public managers to foreign 
countries where the public sector has been working with performance management for a 
longer period of time than in Denmark. Many of the key managers in the organization have 
been sent on such a study tour. This can be described as a source of infection, where the 
majority of managers who return from the such a trip is filled by an enthusiasm about the 
concept. The first official meeting of the organization where the new concept was on the 
agenda was attended by a strategy group consisting of managers representing different areas 
in the organization and two consultants from the external consulting company. 
 
A manager told the following about her encounter with the concept. 
 
Interviewer: "Do you remember what you thought when you first heard that you had to work 
that way?" 
Manager: "Yes, but now I'm not very objective because I'm actually one of the first that 
started working that way and I have been here for a long time, and I was very excited." 
Interviewer: "What was it that made you excited?" 
Manager: "It was that…how to put it… if you took the old way of working with performance 
contracts…you sat down every year and asked "what should we do", and then you formulated 
some goals but it was not really goals. It was what we wanted to achieve before a certain 
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deadline. Or before 1 February we should have done this and that, and it is okay that you must 
achieve something before a certain deadline, but nobody cared if it made a difference. 
Nobody cared that you should do something that could make a difference and that made it 
meaningless" 
 
She continues to talk about her experience with the strategy concept: 
 
Interviewer: "When did employees heard about the concept the first time, or how did the 
employees hear about it the first time? The strategy and value chain and effect on society... " 
 
Manager: "I actually believe that for those I have worked together with for a long time it 
happened when I came home from that study thing, we all took part in the first time and 
where I was completely excited and thought, this is a clever way to work. And I remember we 
sat, the top manager and I, and made the first attempt with it on the way home on the plane. 
We were both very excited by the thought that we could work this way. And, in fact, I think 
that it was very captivating. After a while, you always find that it is not so easy, but it can be a 
bit tempting because the idea is so pure. And so, it is about just trying to get the idea to fit in, 
so it might be flexible enough in relation to the political part of the organization. You cannot 
just take it and put it in, because nothing works that way." 
 
From a virus perspective, the interpretation of the manager’s response is similar to that of the 
first symptoms of an infection, enthusiasm, but the virus’ effect is weakened when it meets 
the organizational reality. The remarkable thing is that the first carrier, a top executive, 
delegated the daily responsibility to a manager, which in turn has delegated responsibility to 
an employee. This insulates the CEO from the reality that apparently neutralizes the 
enthusiasm for the strategy concept. 
 
The virus also has a feature that increases its ability to infect: An appealing rhetorical 
wrapping, as this manager noted: 
 
Interviewer: "Are there any word in the strategy, which seem wrong to you?" 
Manager: "The words in the strategy are put in very general terms, so no." 
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Interviewer: "How are they general?" 
Manager: "It's very hard to disagree with any of it. The terms are too general. It only happens 
when we ask what actions we should do. When we do that, there are a lot of discussions." 
 
This manager saw that there is a difference between the rhetorical packaging and the content. 
It is difficult to disagree with the wording of the strategy itself, while there may be 
disagreement about the concrete actions that will lead the organization to achieve the goals. 
This affects the organization in a way that results in the use of plenty of resources on 
meetings, discussions, negotiations, presentations and all the other activities the 
implementation of a new strategy entails. So, the strategy leads to a higher level of activity 
and the resources used for this activity will be taken from other activities. This was also 
mentioned at the first meeting between representatives of the organization and the consultants 
who were assigned to explain the concept to the representatives. The managers mentioned that 
the last time they had to work with a new concept for managing they almost forgot to do some 
of the tasks that they were required to do by law. This led to criticism from the National Audit 
Office. This meant that some of the managers were sceptical and immune to the virus, as they 
had previously experienced a virus somewhat like it. 
 
However, not all involved behaved like they were struck by a fever. This caused some 
problems for those who were not infected, and therefore saw themselves as clear-sighted 
among a majority who had hallucinations. There were no places in the organization that were 
free of infected individuals, and they were usually in large numbers or they were in powerful 
places in the organization. A manager talked about this experience: 
 
Interviewer: "What do you do when you have doubts, do you say something to someone or do 
you keep it to yourself? 
 
Manager: "I keep it to myself. Because the train has already left, and there is no reason to say 
it, because we've been told that we need to work that way, we must identify areas where we 
can create effects. And then we make a strategy and then we test it, so it's an experiment. But 
we tried that last year, in 2010 and it did not work at all. And the directive is that we should 
try it. Well, fine, then we try it. Well, I cannot say that I think it is a dangerous theory because 
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then my boss will tell it to the CEO and say we'd better not do it. It's not worth it." 
 
The manager shows signs of being immune to the new strategy because they have already 
tried implementing new strategies before and it did not work. He thinks the strategy is 
dangerous because they waste the resources doing something that does not work. This he 
could not tell anyone, since the virus has already infected the decision makers. It turns the 
world upside down, because it is the healthy, and not the infected as we know to be normal 
from the hospitals, that are isolated. 
Although the intention of the new concept was to replace the performance contracts, it turned 
out that the performance contracts were more tenacious, and the new idea could not kill them. 
It makes the job of the managers difficult when they have to deal with two contradictory 
ideas. A manager voiced how it had affected the daily work: 
 
Interviewer: "Has your job become easier or more difficult after the strategy was introduced? 
Manager: "It has become more difficult." 
Interviewer: "Yes?" 
Manager: "Because the intention is that the strategy should replace our performance contract. 
But it has not happened. We still have our contract and now we have the strategy too.”  
Interviewer: "Yes?" 
Manager: "So we have to do all these things, and so it must result in all these effects. So, there 
are a lot more goals now than before." 
Interviewer: "Okay. Do you expect the performance contract to disappear?” 
Manager: "Yes, it is the plan that it will.” 
Interviewer: "But you do not know when?" 
Manager: "Yes. But I do not know when we are ready for it. 
Interviewer: "What is most important to you, the strategy or the performances contract?" 
Manager: "The performance contract is definitely important. Because, how can I put it, we are 
a factory. And the contract is our production schedule. It says how much we should make of it 
and ... So how many blue blocks and how many yellow bricks and how many kilometre ropes, 
we have to make, and how thick it should be. So, we do not know what we should do if we 
didn’t have a contract. And then we are also measured by it ... So, all activities are giving 
points, and it is a performance measurement." 
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There are two viruses in the organization that influence it in different ways. One has effects 
and the other has production goals. Although one should eliminate the other, they live side by 
side, which makes the manager's work more difficult. However, it seems that the performance 
contract at that time was the strongest viral idea, because it simultaneously served as a 
production plan and a strategy. It binds itself to the organism in symbiosis, where it creates 
and provides order so long as the organization continues to produce production goals and 
work towards achieving them. It is interesting that the manager expects that the performance 
contract will disappear, though he does not know when it will happen. A critical interpretation 
would compare this with the infected person that is hoping that the disease will disappear by 
itself, but who is not able to put an exact date on when this will happen. The manager does 
not contemplate the possibility that the idea might be or lead to a chronic state. It should also 
be noted that on the one hand he says that the performance contract will disappear, but on the 
other hand he also says "... we do not know what we should do if we do not have a contact." 
At that time, he has no alternative to the way of organizing work that the performance 
contracts use. Therefore, it can be argued that the performance contract cannot be dispensed 
with until there is an alternative that can tell them how they should organize their work. 
 
The first meeting about the concept 
A group of managers was formed with the purpose of producing strategies for the 
organization, which were intended to be in accordance with the new concept.  This group of 
managers encountered the new concept at a workshop conducted by external consultants. 
There were eight participants from the organization and two external consultants present. The 
head of the group was the manager from the department that had the responsibility for the 
performance contracts. The other participants represented all the different agencies of the 
organization. The head of the group stated that “The purpose of the workshop was to create a 
language and a concept (for strategy), that we all can understand.". The meeting began with a 
presentation of the participants, including the two external consultants who were in charge of 
leading the meeting. One of the consultants started the meeting by explaining that due to the 
time restrictions on the meeting a clear focus on discussing the concept which would be the 
next version of the performance management tool would be necessary. 
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One of the participants asked, "At what level is the concept supposed to influence our 
organization? We already have models that work." The head of the group said, "We must 
discuss how deep the concept will go." 
 
After the consultants had explained the key ideas in the concept as KPIs, output, performance, 
and effectiveness and value change, the participants had two types of questions. The first type 
was questions about what separates this concept from the one that they already had. The 
second type of question expressed doubt that it was possible to make a value chain, as the 
social impact of their work depended on actors outside the organization. This doubt was 
addressed with a statement from one of the consultants:"It's not an exact science – it is a tool 
that enables us to talk about whether we are doing the right things. It's a way to have a 
managerial dialogue about what we do." The head of the group had no doubt that it could be 
done, and talked about how they at a later point would create what he called performance 
budgeting, where they linked the strategic and financial goals together so they could know the 
cost of the effects. The chief consultant said that no one had been successful in doing this, but 
the head argued that “We should be ambitious in this work.” 
 
Following a discussion of the key points in the concept, the consultants presented their ideas 
of a concept, which was inspired by a concept used in another ministry. The head of the group 
stated that the concept should be simple. The consultants asked, "Which elements of your 
current models do you want to keep?" There was no answer. Then the consultants left the 
meeting and the remaining participants continued the discussion, which mainly focused on the 
risk of the concept. The participants made statements like "It's good to make room for 
individual differences. We can understand the top management’s fascination that we all work 
towards the same goal, but that's just not possible." And "It doesn’t make any sense that we 
all should agree on all the goals."  
 
The participants were sceptical of the idea that it was possible to formulate universally 
common goals. Several participants mentioned that the last time that they made a concept for 
performance managing it took so many resources that they almost got the National Audit 
Office on their back for not doing the tasks that they should. This debate ended without 
conclusions and the head of department finished the meeting of by arranging a new meeting 
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date. 
 
After the meeting, a task group was established would meet regularly to give each other 
feedback and share knowledge.  
 
One and a half years after the first meeting 
In the beginning the group met regularly, but as time went by they didn’t meet so often. One 
and a half years after the first meeting with the group, there was an important meeting where 
they had to look at the quality of the two strategies. It had been six months since their last 
meeting. In the meantime there had been a change of government and the new government 
had made organizational changes with the creation of a new agency and a new head of the 
department. The head of the group was not present since he attended a meeting about the new 
agency. The new head opened the meeting by stating that he was now in charge. He also 
informed the participants that he might have to leave the meeting early due to another meeting 
about the new agency. 
 
The managers from the agencies presented their business strategies, and during the 
presentations the head left the meeting. After the presentations, the discussion began. 
 
The participants were still focused on the KPIs, and used indicators as a synonym for or as an 
elaboration on the KPIs in the same sentence. Their doubts about the concept were no longer 
at a fundamental level but at an operational level. 
 
The questions about the participants’ doubts were presented to a senior consultant from the 
department, and he could not provide any answers that seemed to satisfy the participants. 
They asked no questions about why they should use the concept, but how they should 
operationalize it. Nobody questioned the fundamental ideology of the concept; whether it is 
possible to create a value chain and whether it is possible to distinguish between the influence 
of the organization and external actors on a given target. However they asked questions about 
how to get the concept to work in practice. Of course it can be argued that it was not 
surprising that there were no objections at the meeting because of the change in power 
relations. Participants had been working on this for so long that they knew what was 
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legitimate and not legitimate to ask questions about. An interesting finding, however, was that 
neither the head of the division nor the top manager was present when the discussions began. 
The senior consultant represented the department and therefore it can be argued that the 
discussion was not among equals. These explanations are plausible, but the interesting part is 
the development that had occurred since the first meeting. 
 
The participants asked for answers from the department on how to solve the problems they 
experienced, and this can be considered to be indicative part of the power game between the 
agencies and the department. This can be interpreted in at least two ways, each of which 
depends on partly the awareness of the participants of the power relationship and partly on the 
situation at the last meeting.  
 
The first interpretation is based on the assumption that managers are not infected. In an 
elegant way they place the responsibility for the strategies on the department leadership level. 
Their questions imply that the department must have the right answers, since they are the ones 
who initiated the work. They play the role of managers who just do what they are told, and 
when they find it difficult to do what they are told, their commissioner must help them. The 
managers are fully aware of that the department doesn’t have any solutions, but they impose 
on them the responsibility to find them. And so, they appear cooperative and submissive. But 
this interpretation is based on the assumption that participants are aware of the power 
relationship, and they want to level the asymmetry. 
 
The second interpretation is based on the assumption that the managers are infected. They can 
no longer remember their objections and their doubt is gone. Unlike at the first meeting, there 
is no longer an opposition to the concept. Nobody asked critical questions about the concept. 
They were interested in how they could make the concept work. It seemed that they had 
collective amnesia, and could no longer remember their professional and logical arguments 
against the concept to begin with. 
 
Conclusion 
This article proposes the use of virus theory as an analytical framework for strategic work in 
organizations. It focuses on the negative effects that strategy has on the organization. In this 
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example, it is a CEO who is infected by the virus, which has the form of a concept for a 
strategy. Then the CEO consciously infects the rest of the top management group, which 
decides that the strategy concept is to replace their existing strategy concept called 
performance contracts. It seems that the first symptom of infection is an excitement that is 
later neutralized by the encounter with concrete organizational realities. After one and a half 
years a memory loss has emerged, where the infected managers forget their critique of the 
concept, and become solely concerned with getting the concept to work. There are also 
examples of managers who are immune to the new virus. This is because the strategy concept 
bears resemblance to a previous concept. There were no positive effects at this earlier 
instance, and therefore the managers are resistant to implementing the new concept. Finally, 
the intention was that the new concept should replace the old one. This was not the case as the 
old concept remained in use when organizing the tasks of the departments. As a result, some 
managers felt that their work had become more difficult as they had to deal with two types of 
management tools simultaneously.  
 
This virus perspective on strategy raises not only a discussion of the negative effects of 
strategies in an organization, but also of the fact itself that technologies can and should be 
studied as viruses. Therefore, it is debatable which diseases technologies inflict on their host. 
Is it comparable to polio, rabies or just a relatively harmless common cold? Another aspect of 
this perspective is the question of how an organization grows immune to certain viruses. What 
happens on an institutional level, where certain technologies cannot live in some 
organizations, at the system level, where there are systems that prevent certain types the 
infection of certain systems or concepts, and at the individual level, where key decision 
makers are immune, because of past experience? A third aspect is how technologies exchange 
properties the same way two viruses may mutate when both are present in the same host. The 
fourth and last aspect is the built-in feature in technologies to multiply in an organism. Some 
viruses, such as the common cold, spread rapidly and are detected immediately, while other 
viruses, such as HIV, spread slowly, and entail the risk that the host will only discover it when 
it is far too late. 
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